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The sight of oneself on a stadium screen when filmed as part of the crowd at a football game comes as 
a pleasant surprise to most people and usually does not cause any confusion. The brain recognizes the 
artificial nature of the image and deals adequately with the apparent conflict caused by seeing a visual 
representation of its own body where it should not be. However, when a carefully designed 
experimental setup eliminates most of the clues about the synthetic nature of the visual scenery, 
processing of contradictory sensory information concerning the localization of one's own body can 
produce astonishing results.  
 
Recently, two research groups (Reports, "Video ergo sum: Manipulating bodily self-consciousness," B. 
Leggenhager et al., 24 August 2007, p. 1096; Brevia, "The experimental induction of out-of-body 
experiences," H. Ehrrson, 24 August 2007, p. 1048) manipulated self-localization by filming human 
subjects from behind their back and relaying the captured images in real-time to stereoscopic goggles 
worn by the participants. Thus the subjects saw a virtual copy of their body in front of themselves. In 
the study by Lenggenhager and colleagues (1), the experimenters stroked the back of their subjects so 
that they could see the application of this tactile stimulation on the virtual body. Participants reported 
feeling the strokes at the location at which they saw them being applied to the virtual body, rather than 
to their real body, and they indicated that it seemed as if the virtual body was their own. In the study 
by Ehrsson (2), on the other hand, the author stroked the chest of his subjects, invisibly to them, and 
applied synchronous strokes to a location just below the camera standing behind the participants (the  
rod approached the lens and then disappeared just below it with each stroke). In this situation, the 
subjects reported feeling as if the rod approaching the camera touched their real chest; they said they 
had the impression of being located at the camera's position, and that seeing their virtual body from 
behind was almost like looking at someone else.   
 
In both situations, the brain localizes the self based on four different lines of sensory information: (i) 
the origin of the visuo-spatial perspective; (ii) the location of the visual representation of the body; (iii) 
the location of the somatosensory perception of the strokes; and (iv) the location of the visual 
perception of the strokes. In both experimental setups, however, as opposed to everyday experience, 
these four sensory cues do not provide congruent information. I suggest that careful re-examination of 
the data collected in these two fascinating experiments allows us to gauge the relative importance of 
each of these cues with respect to self-localization, and that, by doing so, we can both extend and in 
part contradict, the conclusions drawn by the authors themselves.   
 
 
  
 In (1) the subjects localized the self where they visually perceived both their body and the 
application of somatosensory stimulation. However, this location coincided neither with the origin 
of the visuo-spatial perspective nor with the actual location of somatosensory stimulation. In (2) 
the self was localized at the origin of the visuo-spatial perspective, which also coincided with the 
location of the visual perception of somatosensory stimulation. This location, however, was 
neither identical to that of the visual representation of the body nor to that of the somatosensory 
stimulation. Therefore, it appears that self-localization depends foremost on the visual perception 
of the application of somatosensory stimuli. On the other hand, in neither experiment did the 
actual location at which somatosensory stimuli were applied correspond to self-localization, 
although the strokes were subjectively perceived at the location of the self in both situations. As 
for the other two sensory cues supporting self-localization, namely, the visuo-spatial perspective 
and the location of the visual representation of the body in space, they both corresponded to self-
localization in one case and did not in the other. Why should tactile information play a 
subordinate role in this competition of sensory cues? The subordinate role appears reasonable 
when one considers that localization of tactile cues pertains to one's own organism exclusively 
and cannot possibly provide information as to the position of the body with respect to 
surrounding space. When somatosensory and visual information about a single action are not 
congruent, the brain therefore shifts the reference frame of the somatosensory system in order to 
obtain a rematch, as suggested by the subjects' statements that they felt the strokes on the virtual 
body (1), or that the touch felt on their chest was attributed to the rod approaching the camera 
(2). A similar dominance of visual over tactile (and proprioceptive) information is apparent in the 
rubber-hand illusion (3). However, it is important to note that the visual information with which 
the brain is confronted in these experimental setups cannot be considered as a whole but must be 
subdivided into the components listed further above. Thus the pseudo-congruent visuo-tactile 
input about the brush strokes seems to triumph over two other cues contained in the visual input, 
namely, the first-person perspective inherent to it—the origin of which did not match self-
localization in (1); and the visual representation of one's body in space—the location of which did 
not match self-localization in (2). Contrary to Ehrsson's (2) conclusion, I believe that it is the visual 
description of the brush strokes which is used to update the body-centered reference frames  
rather than the visuo-spatial perspective; the visuo-spatial perspective does not necessarily 
coincide with self-localization, as is clearly apparent from (1).   
 
It is interesting to note that the overridden visual information, such as the noncongruent visual 
representation of the body in space, may be modulated by the brain at high cognitive levels in a 
further effort to attain coherence. In Ehrsson's (2) experiment, subjects reported that looking at 
their own body from behind felt like looking at someone else, the result of perfectly logical 
reasoning: How could this body possibly be mine if it is not where I am?   
 
Kaspar Meyer   
 
Brain and Creativity Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-2520, USA. 
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We welcome K. Meyer's comparative analysis of two recent data sets on how the brain localizes the 
conscious self (Brevia, "The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences," by H. H. Ehrsson, 24 
August 2007, p. 1048; Reports, "Video ergo sum: Manipulating bodily self-consciousness," by B. 
Lenggenhager et al., 24 August 2007, p. 1096) highlighting four relevant cues: the visual representation 
of the body (Fig. 1, white body),the origin of the visual perspective (Fig. 1, white cone), as well as the 
visual (Fig. 1, white stick) and the tactile perception (Fig. 1, black stick) of the applied touch (stroking). 
Meyer concludes that in this situation self-localization (Fig. 1, yellow sphere) most importantly depends 
on the visual perception of the pseudo-congruent event (stroking) since participants localized the self 
at the location where they visually perceived somatosensory stimulation (visual dominance). He adds 
that in (2) self-localization may also coincide with the location of the visual representation of the body 
or in (1) with the location of the visual perspective, but not with the location of somatosensory 
stimulation. We partially agree and propose that his insightful analysis should be extended by 
incorporating additional results from both studies (using temporally incongruous cues that have been 
tested during asynchronous stroking conditions (1, 2). 
  
   
Figure 1: Experimental set-up of Ehrsson [(1), left column] and Lenggenhager et al. [(2), right column] is 
shown. This is shown separately for the following experimental conditions: A) synchronous visuo-tactile 
stimulation (stroking), B) asynchronous stimulation, and C) the respective set-ups without any stroking. 
Real objects and the real body of the participants are indicated in dark colors whereas the virtual 
objects and the virtual body of the participants are indicated in light colors. The cone indicates the 
location of the visual perspective. The light body corresponds to the visual representation of the body 
(virtual). The light stick represents the location of visual "stroking" and the dark stick the tactile 
stroking. The yellow sphere indicates self-location (slightly elevated in order to facilitate its graphical 
depiction). Yellow brackets were added when self-location was not explicitly tested in (1, 2) (Illustration 
by Michael Mouthon).  
  
In the asynchronous stroking conditions (Fig. 1b) participants received the same four cues, but the 
pseudo-congruent cues of the stroking are no longer temporally synchronous, leading to important 
differences in self-localization. Even if not explicitly tested, participants seemed under this condition to 
localize the self where they felt the somatosensory stimulation (and not where they perceived it 
visually) coinciding (2) with the origin of the visual perspective (Fig. 1b, right) and (1) with the spatial 
visual representation of the body (Fig. 1b, left). This shows that the temporal incongruence of a 
pseudo-congruent event alters self-localization, allowing tactile cues to "triumph" over the other 
tested cues. We caution that self-location has been evaluated by different survey questions and 
behavioral measures (locomotion vs. emotional response to threat); further studies are needed to 
compare self-location directly using identical experimental conditions, questions, and behavioral 
measures.   
 
What about self-location without any stroking applied to one’s body? We agree with Meyer that seeing 
one's body on a screen usually does not lead to disturbed self location especially when other 
surrounding cues are available. Yet, viewing a visual representation of one's body in 3D standing in 
front of one's body and without direct sight of one's actual body (even without any stroking) is 
characterized by a spatial conflict between the visual perspective and the visual representation of one's 
body. Where would participants now localize the self—to the origin of the visual perspective, the visual 
representation of the body, or another location? It also seems to us that we [Lenggenhager et al. (2)] 
and Ehrsson (1) had different assumptions about self-localization when considering the situation 
without visuo-tactile conflict (Fig. 1c). We (2) assumed that participants would localize their self at their 
actual body position while matching the virtual visual perspective (from the camera located behind) to 
their actual body position and feeling as though they see their body standing in front of them (Fig. 1c, 
right). Only through synchronous (back) stroking did participants identify with the location of their 
visual body representation (Fig. 1a, right). We believe that Ehrsson (1) assumed that participants would 
match the visual body representation [and not the visual perspective as in (2)] with the actual body 
(Fig. 1c, left). Only through synchronous (chest) stroking do participants localize the self at the location 
of the visual perspective (Fig. 1a, left). We think that explicit experimental testing in this additional 
baseline condition is crucial for further understanding the localization of the conscious self. For 
example, applying threat as done in (1) not only to the visual perspective (Fig. 1c, white cone) but more 
importantly also to the visual body representation (Fig. 1c, white body) will allow researchers to 
disentangle experimentally where the conscious self is localized in conditions with spatial conflict 
between the visual perspective and the visual body representation. 
 
What other cues might be utilized for self-location in addition to the ones discussed by Meyer? In 1899, 
Stratton described "self"-observations when walking with a portable device of mirrors that were 
aligned in such a way that he could see a projection of his body below him (3). Mizumoto and Ishikawa 
(4) installed a fixed camera in the corner of a room and projected the filmed scene (including the 
participant's body) onto the participant's head-mounted display so that participants could see their 
body while walking. Both experiments created a spatial conflict comparable to those described above 
(with no stroking; between the visual representation of the body and the visual perspective) as well as 
a spatial conflict between the visual perception of the moving body and the associated sensori-motor 
cues from the actual body movements (tactile, proprioceptive and vestibular cues). Interestingly, 
Stratton experienced self-location simultaneously at an elevated visual perspective and at position of 
the visuomotor body representation, associated with the feelings of "being out-of-body." Similarly, 
Mizumoto and Ishikawa (4) mention the experience of the self at the location of visual perspective and 
at the location of the visual body representation. Such sensations of disembodiment of the self and 
even bilocation of the self have also been described in neurological patients with heautoscopy and out-
of-body experiences (5), but not in the studies by Lenggenhager et al. (2) and Ehrsson (1). These 
observations and comparable experimental strategies for body part ownership (6) suggest that future 
studies on self-location should also manipulate motor commands and associated sensori-motor cues as 
such additional conflicts will allow researchers to describe the multisensory and sensorimotor 
representations of body and self more comprehensively.   
 
  
 
 
As mentioned above, additional insights about self location, representation, and perspective have been 
gauged from studies in neurological patients. These reports suggest even more complex interactions of 
different integration processes. Patients with self disturbances report, for example, separable auditory and 
visual perspectives [i.e.(5); patient 4]. Moreover, a recent study based on electrical cortical stimulation 
shows a clear separation of self-location and visual perspective (7). In other patients, two rapidly 
alternating or even simultaneous visual perspectives may be experienced [(5); patient 2 and (8)], leaving 
patients perplexed as to where the self is: At the location of the visual body representation, or the visual 
perspective? Also, self-location and the perspective of patients with congenital blindness and normally 
seeing humans with closed eyes further testify to the various multisensory and not exclusively visual 
perspectives, likely to be utilized in self-location. Collectively, these observations suggest that visual 
dominance is an important, but not exclusive, mechanism with respect to body representations as well as 
perspectives. When visual cues are missing or unreliable, other cues gain importance, leading to predictable 
shifts in phenomenal self-localization; this depends, for example, on whether spatially and temporally 
incongruent cues are employed. We predict that the merging of cognitive science with neuroimaging and 
virtual-reality based technology should make it possible to study brain mechanisms in a way that will 
generate the experience of a unitary conscious self localized at one single position and possessing a unified 
perspective that has eluded philosophical and scientific scholarship.   
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Kaspar Meyer has compared the results of Ehrsson (1) and Lenggenhager et al. (2) and come to the 
conclusion that "self-localization depends foremost on the visual perception of the application of 
somatosensory stimuli," and therefore, that the visual perspective plays a subordinate role. Meyer's 
argument is based entirely on the study of Lenggenhager et al. (2) in which "participants reported feeling 
the strokes at the location at which they saw them being applied to the virtual body, rather than to their 
real body." As pointed out by Meyer and Lenggenhager (2), this would indeed correspond to a whole-body 
version of the rubber-hand illusion (RHI) (3) from the third-person perspective, which would suggest that 
the first-person visual perspective plays little role in how we perceive our own bodies (4).   
 
One problem with this view is that it goes against what we know about the RHI. The elicitation of this 
illusion does not only require simultaneous tactile and visual stimulation on corresponding parts of the 
rubber hand and the hidden real hand, but also that the fake arm is anatomically aligned with the real one 
so that it looks like the person's real hand from the first-person perspective. Importantly, if the rubber arm 
is rotated so that it looks like someone else's arm, the illusion breaks down (5–7). Likewise, the illusion only 
works if the fake arm is placed within 30 to 40 cm of the real arm (8), making the projection of touch over 
several meters, as in Lenggenhager's study, unlikely (2). Therefore, we are of the opinion that the projection 
of touch sensations and body ownership onto external objects only works within reaching distance from the 
real body (near-personal space) and from a first-person perspective (8, 9).   
 
A second problem with Meyer's argument is that it predicts that it should be possible to induce a whole 
body rubber hand illusion with a mannequin placed a couple of meters in front of a participant, even 
without the use of virtual reality technology. However, we have tested this in 10 naïve participants and 
many of our colleagues without ever being able to induce such an illusion. We are therefore skeptical about 
the possibility that the RHI might work on whole bodies viewed from the third-person perspective.  
  
We believe the results of Lenggenhager's study depend on the use of video-cameras and head-mounted 
displays. We can not see how this technology would facilitate the multisensory mechanisms of the rubber-
hand illusion. Instead, we propose the alternative interpretation that people were experiencing that their 
back was being filmed by two CCTV cameras placed behind them, and that they were looking at a video 
reconstruction of their own body projected in front of themselves (the virtual body). Indeed, in 
Lenggenhager's first experiment this was exactly what was happening. In the second experiment, the 
participants misidentified a mannequin as themselves, which is of course a quite extraordinary finding in its 
own right. But we do not think that this is a perceptual illusion like the RHI (3) or the out-of-body illusion 
(1). It is more an example of the human’s ability to understand complex spatial transformations in video-
systems and mirrors, such as when recognizing yourself on the CCTV surveillance monitor in a shop.   
 
This alternative interpretation could be consistent with the questionnaire data and spatial drift measure 
presented in Lenggenhager's article. The problem with the questionnaire is that the questions are 
somewhat ambiguous when applied to the virtual reality set-up. Specifically, they were not designed to 
differentiate between genuine projection of ownership and touch to the mannequin/virtual body, or self 
recognition in a video system. The experiment of Groenegress and colleagues (10) is directly relevant to this 
discussion. These authors carried out a set of experiments in virtual reality using a very similar protocol to 
that of Lenggenhager et al (2). However, no reliable illusion of ownership of the virtual body or sensation of 
touch originating from it was reported in the questionnaire. Furthermore, nowhere in Lenggenhager's study 
was any mention made of whether the participants ever stopped feeling the touch on their on real back 
(see Meyer's main comment above).   
 
With respect to the spatial drift measure, Lenggenhager and colleagues (11) recently pointed out that their 
participants did not actually feel that they were located inside the virtual body, but rather, they mislocalized 
their own body by 17 to 25 cm from its actual location in the direction towards the virtual body, which is 
  
 
 
 
considerably less than the actual distance of two meters between the bodies (2). It is also unclear how well 
this spatial drift measure correlates with the actual feeling of being the virtual body because the spatial 
drift in the virtual body's condition did not differ substantially from the condition where the virtual body 
was replaced with an object that did not resemble a body [see Fig. 3 in (2)].  
 
From this discussion it should be evident that there are a number of outstanding questions with respect to 
how to relate the results from the studies of Lenggenhager et al. (2), Ehrsson et al. (1), and Botvinick and 
Cohen (3). What is needed now are new experiments that directly compare changes in ownership and 
touch location on artificial bodies using first- and third-person visual perspectives within the same 
experimental design. We also need to acquire more knowledge about the perceptual and brain processes 
that mediate the spatial transformations when seeing one's body from the third-person perspective in 
mirrors, video systems and immersive virtual reality environments (12, 13). However, as described so 
clearly by Gibson (14), the first-person perspective is how we normally see our bodies and the correlations 
of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals from this perspective play a critical role in the perception of our 
own bodies.   
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